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Abstract 
In this paper we report the results from a series of experiments on Cournot (homogeneous 
and differentiated products) and Bertrand (differentiated products) duopoly markets with 
no uncertainty, fixed endpoints and random matching.  For each set, the experiments are 
designed with three alternative information set up: I) no information (participants are 
only informed on their own payoff for the period), 2)  average industrial profit 
(participants are informed on their own performance, as well as on the average profit in 
all markets), 3) imitation (players are informed, on request, on their rivals’ past 
successful actions). The effect of different information structures on individual behaviour 
in market experiments is a long debated issue. Recently, using evolutionary arguments, it 
has been argued that the imitation of successful strategies induces more competitive 
equilibria in market games (M. Schaffer, 1989; F. Vega-Redondo 1997).  By the same 
token, the information on the industry’s average profitability might induce more collusive 
outcomes, if such markets signals are perceived by players as aspiration levels and if they 
therefore try new strategies anytime their profits fall below such threshold (F. Palomino 
and F. Vega-Redondo, 1999; H. Dixon, 2000).  Our aim is to test such predictions in  
duopoly price and quantity games. We find that the imitation learning rule prevails when 
players have full information on their rivals’ previous choices, and such learning 
behaviour induces more competitive outcomes in the Cournot market designs. As for the  
aspiration learning rule, the evidence is unclear. Whilst in the majority of the cases, 
players experiment new strategies when their payoff falls below the average profit, as 
predicted by the aspiration rule, we find no evidence of convergence to collusion, though 
in the Cournot experiments, the fraction of players choosing cooperative actions in the 
last stages of the game significantly increase in the second information setting.     
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           Introduction 
 
In this paper we report the results from a series of experiments on Cournot 
(homogeneous and differentiated products) and Bertrand (differentiated 
products) duopoly markets with no uncertainty, fixed endpoints and random 
matching.  For each model, the experiments are designed with three 
alternative information settings. In the first case, participants are informed 
only on their own payoff for the period (Experimental Design 1; ED 1, 
hereafter); In the second case, participants are informed on their own 
performance, as well as on the average profit in all duopoly markets in the 
previous period (Experimental Design 2; ED 2, hereafter); Finally, in the 
third design, players are informed, on request, on their rivals’ past actions 
and payoffs (Experimental Design 3; ED 3, hereafter).  In all experimental 
sessions, however, players were informed on the cost and demand functions 
and the number of periods the experiments lasted.  
The effect of different information settings on firms’ behaviour is a long 
debated issue, and there is little theoretical agreement on their predicted 
impact on competition
1. The Nash prediction on oligopoly dynamic models, 
with fixed endpoints, consider the disclosure of individual firm’s decisions 
or the publication of aggregate statistics on the market performance as 
irrelevant to the degree of market competition, since individual behaviour 
should be unaffected in both cases. 
An alternative prediction has been put forward in most traditional 
Industrial Organization models on oligopoly (Stigler, 1964) and has 
inspired many regulatory and antitrust policies
2. According to this point of 
view, whilst the publication of general statistics on the industrial   2
profitability has no impact on competition, since behaviour should be 
unaffected, the full disclosure of individual data is detrimental to 
competitive practices. In fact, when information is complete, cartels can be 
enforced, since any defection is immediately detected and punished, and 
therefore collusion is encouraged. 
Recent evolutionary models on learning and bounded rationality take a 
completely different perspective, and consider all types of information as 
relevant to individual behaviour, with a final impact on competition, but the 
predicted effect is substantially different in the two cases we consider (full 
disclosure of individual data, publication of general statistics on the 
industrial profitability).   
On one side, knowing other people’s actions in the past may induce 
imitation of the more successful strategies (imitate the best). Such 
behavioural rules will increase the level of competition in the industry (M. 
Schaffer, 1989; F. Vega-Redondo 1997). 
By the same token, the information on the industry’s average profitability 
might induce more collusive outcomes, if such markets signals are 
perceived by players as aspiration levels and if they therefore try new 
strategies anytime their profits fall below such threshold (F. Palomino and 
F. Vega-Redondo, 1999; H. Dixon, 2000).  
  The aim of our experiments is to provide a test both of the imitation rule 
and the aspiration rule in duopoly markets, and, more importantly, to test 
whether the amount and type of information matter and affect the level of 
competition, as claimed in the evolutionary models.  
We find that the imitation learning rule prevails when players have full 
information on their rivals’ previous choices, and such learning behaviour 
induces more competitive outcomes in all three market models. As for the 
aspiration learning rule, the evidence is unclear. Whilst in the majority of 
the cases, players experiment new strategies when their payoff falls below 
the average profit, as predicted by the aspiration rule, we do not find clear 
evidence of convergence to collusion, though in two experiments out of   3
three, the fraction of players choosing cooperative actions in the last stages 
of the game significantly increase in the second experimental setting.   In all 
cases, however, we find evidence that the amount and type of information 
produce changes in behaviour and learning, thus affecting the process of 
convergence.   
There are several experimental papers to which our work is connected (S. 
Huck, H. T. Normann, J. Oechssler, 1999; S. Huck,  H. T. Normann, J. 
Oechssler, 2000; A. Bosch-Domenech, N. J. Vriend, 2003, H. D. Dixon, P. 
Sbriglia, E. Somma, 2003, among the others
3). 
In particular, the imitation rule has recently received quite a lot of 
attention (S. Huck, H. T. Normann, J. Oechssler, 2000; A. Bosch-
Domenech, N. J. Vriend, 2003), but the results of these studies are fairly 
contradictory
4, since in one case (S. Huck, et al., 2000) the imitation 
hypothesis is confirmed, while in the other one is rejected.  The evidence on 
the aspiration rule is more scant, though such a learning behaviour has a 
long historical tradition (H. Simon, 1955, 1956); however, the only 
experimental study which test the rule in an oligopoly game, show that 
cooperative outcomes are more likely to occur when players are informed 
on the average profitability of the industry (H. D. Dixon, P. Sbriglia, E. 
Somma, 2003), as predicted in the evolutionary models.  
  
2. Theoretical Background and Experimental Predictions 
The experimental designs were based on three types of duopoly market 
models. In the first case, firms chose the quantity to produce in each period, 
goods were homogeneous. The inverse demand function and the 
corresponding profit function for firm i were, respectively: 
) ( 2 1 q q b a p + − =                        
i i q c p ) ( − = π  
By the same token, in the second case of quantity competition 
(differentiated goods), market demand and individual profits were 
represented by the functions:   4
) ( j i i q q b a p θ + − =  
i i i q c p ) ( − = π  
 
Finally, we consider a model of price competition, where the direct 
demand function is: 
) ( j i i p p q θ β α − − =  
Here, again, profits are: 
i i i q c p ) ( − = π  
 
Table 1 reports the value of the demand coefficients in the three market 
models: 
 
TABLE 1: VALUES OF THE DEMAND COEFFICIENTS 
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The second duopoly model is therefore an example of product 
differentiation, where outputs are strategic complements, and, with the 
corresponding direct demand function, the third model is an example of the 
same kind, where prices are strategic substitutes.
5 
In all three models, the cost function was given by: 
i cq C = ; 
where the marginal cost, c, was equal to zero.  
Let us concentrate on the symmetric solutions in the market games. We 
begin with the standard Nash equilibrium in the three cases, by reporting the 

































  (1) 
where the superscripts stand respectively for the Cournot models 
(homogeneous, c, and differentiated products, cc,) and the Bertrand model 
of competition (b).  
The Nash-Cournot and the Nash-Bertrand solutions are a natural 
benchmark for our tests, and there is wide experimental evidence that such 
solutions are enforced in the laboratory, under a large number of designs 
and models’ variations
6. The Nash equilibrium can be implemented in all 
experimental settings we consider (ED 1, ED 2 and ED 3). The basic 
requirements for its implementation regard in fact the (finite) number of 
periods the game lasted and the absence of structural uncertainty (costs, 
demand and payoffs) and both requirements were met in all sessions. We 
regard ED 1, however, as a benchmark setting, since no extra information is 
provided by the organizers. The existence of the “benchmark” setting 
allows us to state the first experimental prediction: 
Claim I: In the duopoly experiments where participants did not receive 
any extra information on the industrial profitability and the rivals’ actions 
(ED 1), output choices converge to the values reported in (1), and the Nash 
equilibrium solutions represent the correct prediction for the three market 
games.     
Notice that, as it has been found in a number of recent papers on this 
specific issue
7, the emergence of the Nash equilibrium in market games is 
compatible with several learning rules (best reply, fictitious play, and, in 
some cases, qualitative response learning), but we do not attempt to analyse 
individual choices, assuming that the convergence to the Nash equilibrium 
is determined by some sort of adaptive learning process, without ruling out 
sophisticated behaviours.  
Let us now move to the second aim of our investigation, e.g., the study of 
the aspiration learning rules.  As noticed in the introduction, aspiration 
rules have a long standing historical tradition in explaining the behaviour of   6
imperfectly rational agents. We may recall here H. Simon theory on 
bounded rationality, but also, the hypothesis of satisfying behaviour in 
firm’s organisational decision making (R Cyert and J. March (1963)). The 
rationale beyond aspiration rules is that firms, rather than optimising 
agents, tend to be survivors, and their prior objective is to be at least as 
profitable as their opponents, because making losses might force their exit 
from the market (H. Dixon, 2000). 
Evolutionary Game Theoretical models (R. Karandikar, D. Mokerjee, D. 
Ray, 1998; F. Vega-Redondo, 1996; F. Palomino and F. Vega-Redondo, 
1999; H. Dixon, 2000) have studied the implication of the aspiration rules 
in a number of repeated games.  
In F. Palomino and F. Vega-Redondo, 1999, a population of agents is 
randomly paired to play the Prisoner Dilemma game. At each point in time, 
they can observe the population mean payoff, which is taken to be the 
individual aspiration level.
8  Players use a simple decision rule: if they are 
earning below average they switch
9, with a positive probability, to a 
different strategy. It  can be proved that, under fairly general conditions, the 
dynamics of the system converges to a state in which there is a positive 
fraction of cooperators,  the amount of cooperation being dependent on the  
value of the coefficients in the PD game. 
A stronger result is reached by H. Dixon in duopoly Cournot games, where 
firms adopt a similar rule of behaviour, considering the (overall) average 
profit as the individual aspiration level.  
H. Dixon considers an “economy” composed by several duopoly markets, 
where firms are matched in each period to play a Cournot game. Firms 
observe their own payoff, but also the average profit in whole economy (the 
aspiration level). 
At each point in time firms adopt a pure strategy, and, if their payoff is 
below average, then they are likely to experiment something new. If firms 
follow aspiration rules, then collusion “will be the “almost” global attractor 
of the economic system” (H. Dixon, p. 223).   7
There is an aspect of the evolutionary models that needs be emphasized. In 
these models, aspiration are endogenous, since they are driven by the 
working of the (economic) system; in this respect, the emergence of 
cooperation might be brought about not directly by the strategic interaction 
in the individual market (or the individual game), but rather by the market 
forces (in the Cournot games)
10, or the general structure and information of 
the games, in the alternative examples. Going back to our market models, 
the second theoretical benchmark that will be tested in our experiment is 
therefore the symmetric joint profit maximising outcome, that might emerge 
in contexts such the one designed in ED 2. The equilibrium values of the 






























11       (2) 
Our second experimental prediction can therefore be stated in the 
following manner: 
Claim II: In the duopoly experiments where participants received 
information on the industrial profitability, e.g., the average profit in all 
markets for the previous period (ED 2), output choices converge to the 
values reported in (2), and the collusive equilibrium solutions represent the 
correct prediction for the three market games.    
Naturally, we also interested in understanding whether information does 
influence the behaviour of the participants in the experiments, and there is a 
different pattern of choices between the experimental designs ED 1 and ED 
2. 
Finally, in the third experimental design, players had free access to the 
choices of their opponents and imitation was therefore possible. 
The impact of imitative behaviour on the equilibrium selection in market 
games has been analysed in M. Schaffer, 1989 and F. Vega-Redondo 1996, 
and 1997. According to this line of research, imitation positively influences 
the degree of competition even in industries with few sellers. When players 
can observe the opponents’ previous choices, Walrasian output levels may   8
be reached either as effect of imitation or as effect of spiteful behaviour. In 
the first case, imitating the best strategies, the firm will increase (decrease) 
its output every time the market price exceeds (is lower than) the marginal 
cost (S. Huck, H. T. Normann, J. Oechssler, 2000, p. 41), and this process 
leads to competitive outcomes. Imitation is regarded to be a reasonable code 
of behaviour in complex environments, as market games, since it does not 
require sophisticated reasoning. On the other hand, when there is complete 
information on previous actions and rewards, spiteful behaviour - the agent 
chooses actions which might lead to a decrease in his own payoff, but that 
will produce an even greater loss in his opponent’s payoff (beating your 
opponent) - is also a possible learning rule, and it will lead to Walrasian 
outcomes in a similar manner.   
In order to understand why this is the case, we need to recall some 
important aspects of the evolutionary models. Firstly, the theoretical 
framework underlying the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) 
is substantially different in the case of finite populations of agents. In this 
context, as opposed to the infinite population case, a strategy, in order to be 
an ESS, needs not to be a Nash equilibrium, i.e., needs not to be a best reply 
to itself.
12  The reason why non-Nash equilibria can be stationary points in 
the evolutionary dynamics lies in the basic fact that what is important for 
the survival of the strategies/genes (in evolutionary terms) is the magnitude 
of the payoffs in relative rather than absolute terms.  The importance of 
differential payoffs justifies why a “mutant” strategy might be evolutionary 
successful, with respect to a “dominant” strategy, even if its gain – for the 
individual - is lower (in absolute terms) than the gain   provided by the other 
one. What is crucial, in fact, is that the differential payoff of the mutant 
strategy is higher than that provided by the dominant strategy. Considering 
the case of spiteful behaviour, for example,   this happens every time the 
individual adopts a specific strategy which yields him a lower payoff 
relative to other available strategies, but his choice will produce a decrease 
in the opponent’s payoff even greater than his own loss. This ensures that   9
the mutant strategy – which is not a best reply to itself – will survive in the 
long run and defeat the competing strategies/genes. 
If we consider a simple market game, where firms choose quantity 
strategies over a number of periods, it can be proved that the evolutionary 
stable equilibrium, which is enforceable as a consequence of spite or 
imitation is the Walrasian equilibrium, e.g., by choosing a Walrasian output, 
an individual firm may well decrease its own payoff with respect to a, say, a 
Cournot output, but it will always decrease its rival’s payoff even further 
(see F. Vega-Redondo 1996, 1997). On the other hand, for any Walrasian 
configuration, no firm will deviate from that output choice, since the 
deviation would not increase its own profit. In ED 3, we designed an 
experiment to measure the effects of these codes of behaviour.  
In (3) we report the equilibrium values of the Walrasian configurations in 
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Claim III: In the duopoly experiments where participants received 
complete information on their rivals’ choices, (ED 3), output choices 
converge to the values reported in (3), and the Walrasian equilibrium 
solutions represent the correct prediction for the three market games.    
Table 2 reports the values of prices (quantity) and profits corresponding to 
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 p  q  π  p q  π  p q π 
WALRAS 0  24  0  0  24 0  0  24  0 
NASH 8  16  128  8  16 128  9.6  14.4  138.2 




3. Experimental Designs and Financial Incentives 
The experiments were conducted in Siena (May-June 2002) and the 
subjects were recruited among undergraduate and graduate students of   
Law, Business and Economics. Participants received a fee for showing up 
(3 Euro) and they were paid according to their cumulative performance 
during the experiment (observed profits varied between 8 and 12 Euro per 
subject).  The instructions for the experiment were read aloud at the 
beginning of each session, but they could also be accessed at any time 
during the experiment hitting the appropriate key on the computer. There 
were three trial runs, and any aspect of the structure of the experiment was 
discussed by the experimenters. Each market game lasted 20 rounds
14 of 
one to three minutes each (minimum to maximum time allowed) and time 
was given for questions or observations, so to minimise any 
misunderstanding on the working of the computer program. On average, 
each experiment lasted between 30 and 40 minutes.  
The number of participants varied between 16 and 22 (8 to 11 active 
markets in each period), and the experiments consisted of nine sessions 
(three for each information design and each market model),    11
In the instructions (available on request), participants were informed on 
the value of the demand parameters and costs. The information about 
profitability and rivals’ actions was described in the instructions for ED 2 
and 3, and, during the trial runs, examples were made on how to calculate 
individual profits, so to clarify the structure of the market games.  
Participants could choose quantities (prices) from a finite grid, and, in case 
of negative profits, which were never observed, it was explained to students 
that they would use their participation fee in order to pay up their losses. 
Our experimental design is closer in spirit to that of S. Huck, et al., 2000, 
as opposed to the experimental design reported in A. Bosch-Domenech and 
N. J. Vriend, 2003 – both papers dealing with the imitation hypothesis.  It 
has recently been argued (K. Ostmann, R. Selten, 2001) that the two 
settings yield different outcomes, with a higher cooperation rate in 
experiments where subjects had free access to the quantity/profit tables, 
rather than choosing quantities from finite grids. In our opinion, the reason 
why cooperation tends to emerge in the former settings is that, viewing the 
profit table, participants select a smaller set of strategies to play and some 
choices are never used. This behaviour affects the speed of convergence 
and the amount of cooperation in the late stages of the game, since players 
focus their choices on a set of strategies which is closer to the relevant 
market equilibria and dismiss the other ones right at the outset. 
Choosing prices and quantity from a finite grid may slow down the 
process of convergence, if the individual takes longer to learn which 
strategies may produce losses, but we believe it lowers the probability of 
creating framing effects in the experimental design. 
   
4. Results 
We now report the results from the market experiments, answering the 
claims that were enunciated in section 2. We will focus on each 
experimental design, examining first the issue of equilibrium convergence 
within each information setting (ED 1, ED 2 and ED 3).  Comparing the   12
data across the three designs for each market model, we will then try to 
assess whether information did matter and whether  it affected the process 
of equilibrium selection. 
•  Experimental Design 1: Adaptive learning rules 
Figures 1 report the trend of the average quantities in the first 
experimental setting (ED 1), for each market model, throughout the 20 
periods experiments. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE   
Observing the time series, it is possible to gain an initial insight on the 
process of equilibrium convergence in the three models. In all three cases, 
in fact, the average individual choice converged to values close to the Nash-
Cournot equilibrium, but with substantial differences in the Bertrand and 
Cournot model with differentiated products. 
In these two experiments, considering the last three periods of play, one 
can observe a significant divergence from the equilibrium values of 
quantity and price, respectively. Average output choices varied in fact 
between 16.6 and 16.4, exceeding the equilibrium value of 14.4, whilst, in 
the Bertrand setting, average prices settled around the equilibrium value of 
8 in the periods 13-17, and then increased in the final stages, reaching the 
value of 10 in periods 19-20.  
The same conclusion may be reached looking at the relative frequencies of 
play of the individual strategies (averaged over the last three period), in 
each model and reported in Figure 2. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
In the first experiment (Fig. 2a), the relative frequencies are distributed on 
the interval 11-26, with a peak around the Nash value. In the second setting 
the peak is around the values of 17-18, which is considerably higher than 
the Nash equilibrium, and little cooperation is observed in the final stages.  
As far as the Bertrand experiment is concerned, there is an opposite 
situation, with a peak around the Nash value of 8, and a peak around the 
values 9-12, closer to the cooperative equilibrium.   13
Is there enough observational evidence to say that the Nash equilibrium is 
not a good prediction in these market games and claim 1 has to rejected? 
The answer is no, and we will examine the issue of equilibrium 















(where n is the number of players in the experiment) 
In table 4 we report the values of MSD statistics for the last 5 periods in 
the three experiments as a measure of convergence to the Nash equilibrium.   
 
 TABLE 4: CONVERGENCE TO NASH (MSD) 
 C.H.  C.D.  B.D. 
PERIODS      
16 0.133  0.067  0.069 
17 0.199  0.044  0.059 
18 0.193  0.038  0.079 
19 0.115  0.042  0.118 
20 0.055  0.052  0.238 
 
The table shows that there is a higher convergence to the Nash equilibrium 
in the second market model than in the final stages of the Bertrand game 
and than in the Cournot H.P. model.  
Table 5 completes our investigation, comparing the values of the MSD 
statistics calculated, for period 20, with regard to the three alternative 
equilibrium configurations (Nash, Collusion and Walrasian equilibrium), in 
the first experimental design. 
TABLE 5: CONVERGENCE TO MARKET EQUILIBRIA (MSD) 
 C.H  C.D.  B.D 
NASH     0.055                 0.052     0.238 
WALRAS     0.117    0.184     ----- 
JPM     0.247    0.110     0.103   14
 
In two cases out of three (with the exception of the Bertrand market), the 
Nash prediction provides a lower values of the MSD. It must be noticed 
that, since the values of the statistics range between 0 and 1, there is a 
significant difference in both Cournot markets, the Nash equilibrium being 
the best prediction for the games. As for the Bertrand experiment, if we 
consider the value of the long run profits
16,  that is equal to 122,7, and the 
fact that the profits had a low growth rate throughout the experiment (1.09), 
it can be sustained that also in this case the Nash prediction is the most 
successful explanation for the individual behaviour.   
 What we have examined so far allows us to provide an answer to Claim 1: 
 Result 1: When players are not informed on their rivals’ actions nor on 
the average profitability, the Nash prediction results to be a robust 
prediction of the individuals’ behaviour in two cases out of three. In the 
Bertrand market, play converge to the Nash value during the experiment 
and then diverge in the final stages. 
•  Experimental Design 2: Aspiration learning 
We will proceed now to study the second set of data, corresponding to ED 
2. As before, in Figure 3 and 4 we report, respectively, the output (price) 
trends and the relative frequencies of play, averaged over the last three 
periods in each session. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 AND 4 
Two things can immediately be noticed from Figure 3.  First, there is no 
indication that choices were converging towards the collusive equilibrium 
(in two cases, Cournot D.P. and Bertrand D.P. there was on the contrary a 
closer convergence to Nash – e.g., a decrease (increase) in competitiveness 
in the Cournot (Bertrand) model  in the final stages of the games). Second, 
the time series show a higher speed of convergence if compared to the first 
experimental design (ED 1). In the market model Cournot H.P. the average 
quantity (in the last three periods) was around the value of 17.8, and it was 
not significantly different from the value of the average output in the same   15
model in ED 1; in the second market model (Cournot D.P.), however, the 
average quantity was significantly lower than in the alternative information 
setting (ranging in ED 2 around the values of 14-15).   By the same token, 
in the Bertrand model, prices approached the Nash value of 8  (the average 
price varied around 7.6 and 8.3), while in ED 1 they ranged around the 
average value of 10.  
If we look at the relative frequencies of strategies’ play, averaged over the 
last three periods (Figure 4), there is a slightly different picture which can 
be gained from this set of data. In fact, in two cases out of three (both in the 
Cournot models),  we can actually see a significant increase – compared to 
the same model in the ED 1 design - in the proportion of subjects who were 
playing the strategies 11-12 (close to the Collusion value). In the Cournot 
model with homogeneous products, the cumulative frequency of 
participants playing strategies 11-12 increased from 1.8 per cent (ED 1) to 
almost 11 per cent (ED 2). In the second Cournot model, there was an 
increase in cooperation from 1.38 p.c. to about 16.7 p.c.. 
The increase in cooperation is however not sufficient to determine a 
convergence to the joint profit maximising outcome. As before, we analyse 
the process of convergence in Tables 6 and 7.  
TABLE 6: CONVERGENCE TO COLLUSION (ED 2) 
 C.H.  C.D.  B.D. 
PERIODS     
16  0.426 0.297 0.199 
17  0.511 0.296 0.186 
18  0.464 0.470 0.200 
19  0.408 0.270 0.144 
20  0.488 0.281 0.146 
  
TABLE 7: CONVERGENCE TO NASH (ED 2) 
 C.H.  C.D.  B.D. 
PERIODS     
19 0.108  0.100  0.192 
20            0.151  0.113            0.125   16
 
The comparison between the measures of convergence to the Nash 
equilibrium and to the Collusive equilibrium confirms what we have so far 
stressed, that is, information on the average industrial profitability does 
have an effect on cooperation, but there is no evidence of convergence to 
the JPM outcome. This can be stated as follows: 
Result 2: When players are informed on  the average industrial 
profitability, the Nash prediction still results to be a robust prediction of the 
individuals’ behaviour in all three market models. However, in both the 
Cournot markets, there was a significant increase in the proportion of 
subjects playing strategies close to the JPM outcome. 
•  Experimental Design 3: Imitation or Spite 
We finally explore the effects of imitation or spite in market models, by 
looking at the evidence in the third experimental design (ED 3) 
INSERT FIGURES 5 AND 6 
In both Figure 5 and 6, we report the average quantities (prices) and relative 
frequencies of play, averaged over the last three periods. The difference of 
results between this experimental design and the other two is immediately 
evident. In both the Cournot models, the average quantities ranged between 
20-24, e.g., closer to the Walrasian theoretical benchmark. In the Bertrand 
setting the average prices ranged around 5-7. 
Table 6 clarifies some aspects of the experiments. In the first Cournot 
model, average quantities were around 20-22, close to the Walrasian 
equilibrium output, and the relative frequencies show that, in the last three 
periods, the Walrasian choice (23-24) was the most used strategy among 
players. In the two remaining cases, there was a slower convergence to the 
Walrasian values, but the average quantity (20-21) and price (6-7) were 
significantly higher (lower) to the quantity and price achieved in  the 
alternative information contexts. Notice also that players chose actions 
closer to the Walrasian levels than to the Nash equilibrium. Table 8 and 9 
complete our analysis, examining the values of the MSD scores in the   17
Cournot settings, which appear to confirm the conclusions drawn from 
Figures 5 and 6. As before, we measure the process of convergence to the 
predicted outcome stated in Claim 3 and to the alternative equilibrium 
benchmark represented by the Nash equilibrium  
TABLE 8: CONVERGENCE TO WALRASIAN OUTCOMES (ED 3) 
 C.S.  C.D.*  B.D. 
PERIODS      
16 0.016  0.061  ---- 
17 0.025  0.059  ---- 
18 0.047  0.042  ---- 
19 0.027  0.045  ---- 
20 0.041  0.049  ---- 
* Periods 11-15 
 
 
TABLE 9: CONVERGENCE TO NASH (ED 3) 
 C.H.  C.D.  B.D. 
PERIODS      
19          0.137           0.132         0.091 
20          0.153             0.122         0.096 
 
The comparison among the different market models shows a marked 
difference between the Cournot duopolies and the Bertrand market. The 
long run profit value in the latter case was in fact equal to 111,6,  lower 
than the profit value estimated on the benchmark data (122.7), but 
significantly higher than the theoretical predicted value in the Walrasian 
setting. It must be added, however, that in the present setting the growth 
rate of profits in the Bertrand market was indeed negative (-0.98).   
 
Examining the tables and the values of the long run profit, we can 
conclude that in the two Cournot settings the imitation hypothesis work, 
and both markets are more competitive than in the previous experimental 
design. As for the Bertrand model, we do not find a significant difference in   18
final equilibrium values in ED 2 and ED 3, if not that in this third setting, 
prices tend to be lower than in both the alternative contexts.  
We are able now to state our third result and therefore to provide an 
answer to Claim 3: 
Result 3: When players are informed on their rivals’ past actions and 
success, the Walrasian equilibrium values result  to be a robust prediction 
of the individuals’ behaviour in both the Cournot markets, which are 
significantly more competitive than in the alternative designs. In the 
Bertrand model were lower than in the previous settings, but the long run 
value of the average profit was still close to Nash prediction. 
There is a final aspect of our investigation that we wish to underline, and it 
is related to the general impact of information on behaviour. Does 
information matter? How information affected the behaviour of the 
experimental subjects? We can answer to both questions by looking at the 
time series presented in this section. Information does affect individual 
behaviour: we performed a 
2 χ  test to compare the ED 2 and ED 1 and ED 
3 and ED1, respectively, and we rejected the null hypothesis that there was 
no difference among the series (5% significance level). The question on 
how information affects behaviour is an interesting one and has two 
answers. First in Ed 2 and ED 3, there was a faster process of convergence 
to a market equilibrium (information affects the speed of convergence). 
Second, information lowered the variance of the individuals’ choices. This 
implies that subjects used all types of information we provided to build up 
their decisional routines. We feel that this is a good result in support of the 
evolutionary models. 
 
5. Changing regimes: the study of aspiration learning 
 
The results of the previous section indicate that aspiration rules fail the 
convergence test, e.g., we do not observe convergence to the Collusive   19
equilibrium outcome in the three duopoly markets under investigation. This 
result poses the question as to whether aspiration rules are plausible codes 
of behaviour in complex environments, as market games, and how common 
they became among the subjects engaged in the ED 2 experiments.  
We addressed both questions by estimating Markov-switching 
autoregressive models (henceforth MS-AR) on the individual data set of the 
50 subjects participating in the three sessions in Ed 2.   We recall here that 
the rationale beyond aspiration rules is that the probability that individuals 
change their choice increases with the profit differential between their 
payoff and the observed previous period average payoff. In the following, 
we assume that the dynamic of the discrete shifts follows a two state 
Markov process with an AR(1) component for each player. 
Formally, the decision rule may be expressed as a MSM(2)-AR(1) model
17 
of the form: 
[ ] t t s t t s t y y ε µ α µ + − = − − ) 1 ( ) (       ,    ) , 0 ( 2 σ ε N t ≈  
 
where  t y  represents the difference between the individual profit and the 
average market profit; and the unobserved random variable  ) (t s , is a 
generic ergodic Markov chain defined by the transition probabilities: 
() i t s j t s P pij = − = = ) 1 ( ) (  and ∑ =1 ij p
;  ) 2 , 1 ( , ∈ ∀ j i  
Specifically,  ) (t s  takes the values of 1 if a player is in a low profit state 
(which means the subject tries new strategies- experimentation state) and 2 
if a player is in a high profit regime (the subjects does not try new 
strategies- no experimentation state); the conditional mean,  ) (t s µ , switches 
between the two states: 
ation) experiment   (     2 s   if    
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The transition probabilities provide the probability of moving from one 
state to another. Our hypothesis is that the above process follows a 2-state 
Markov chain. It is then possible to collect the transition probabilities in a 















where  ij p  represents the probability of moving from state i to state j. In 
other words,  12 p  is just the fraction of the times that the system is in state 1 
and moves to state 2. 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE) provide the estimates of the 
models’ coefficients and of the unobserved Markov chain, testing the 
existence of the two regimes in the individuals’ decision process. 
In Tables 10, 11 and 12 (see Appendix) the whole MLE estimates are 
reported for the two Cournot experiments and the Bertrand market, 
respectively. The signs of the estimated coefficients for the conditional 
mean in the first state are for each player negative, representing therefore 
the experimentation state. 
The estimated transition probabilities in column 4 and column 5 of table 
10, 11 and 12, representing the probability of moving from one state to 
another are, for almost all players, very low. This means that the two 
regimes are estimated to be very persistent.    
Figures 7, 8 and 9 complete our investigation reporting the individual 
smoothing probability of regime 1 together with the observed values of  t y . 
The Figures report the estimated probabilities for each player in different 
contexts. In particular, the figures do not report the smoothed probabilities 
for player 15 in Bertrand, player 16 in Cournot DP and players 13, 14 and 
17 in Cournot HP. For those players the Wald test does not support the 
existence of two states operating during the experiments.   21
 The overall picture which can be gained by our hypothesis testing is that
18 
the aspiration rule is adopted in the large majority of the cases. From the 
Figures is possible to observe that the probability of being in the 
experimentation state is relatively high each time the difference between the 
individual profit and the average market profit is lower than zero.  
The significance of the parameters estimated by maximum likelihood is 
tested by applying standard Wald test. 
In particular, a further step of the analysis consists of testing whether there 
have been two regimes operating over the sample period. Implementing the 
following Wald test can assess this hypothesis: 
 
22 11 0 1 p p H − = =   
 
() []
() () ( ) 21 21 21 21
2
12 21
cov 2 var var
1






where the above statistic is distributed as a  () 1
2 χ . 
The results of Wald tests are reported in the last column of Table 10-11-
12. In particular, for each player the table report whether the test cannot 
reject the existence of the two states (YES in Tables) at 95% confidence 
level or, on the contrary, the test reject the null hypothesis (NO in Tables).  
  As we can see from Table 10 – 11 - 12 the Wald tests easily reject 
the hypothesis of having only one state operating during the sample period 
for a large number of players. In particular, in the Bertrand experiment, for 
7 player out of 16 the test reject the presence of two regimes while for the 
Cournot DP and Cournot HP models the number of tests that reject the null 
hypothesis is respectively 6 and 3. These results corroborate the evidence 
coming from the previous section: the players operating in the Cournot 
models are more competitive with respect to the player in the Bertrand 
model.       22
F r o m  w h a t  w e  h a v e  s a i d  s o  f a r ,  t h e  aspiration rule can be seen as a 
successful prediction for individuals’ behaviour, although there is no 





In this paper we have tried to assess the importance of information on 
learning behaviour in several experimental markets. We have considered 
three informational settings and we have studied the equilibrium 
convergence process in three market models, for each of the alternative 
scenarios. Our investigation has provided some relevant insights in the 
problem. First, information does matter: the process of equilibrium 
convergence is, in fact, quite different in the alternative contexts. Second, 
information strongly affect the selection of the final equilibrium, as shown 
by the experimental evidence. Third, information affects the process of 
individual learning, as it is proved by our analysis of the aspiration rule. 
These three conclusions are, in our opinion, a positive, though not 
conclusive, test for the recent evolutionary theory on individual learning 
and bounded rationality. Our work leaves, in fact, two unresolved puzzles. 
First, though pervasive, aspiration rules do not lead to collusion. Moreover, 
we do not attempt a comparison among the different rules, nor it is possible 
to test which information (e.g., individual firms’ data or information on the 
average industrial profitability) would be more relevant for the individual 
choice process. We believe that both problems should attract attention in 
the future, in order to provide complete tests of the alternative rationality 
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1 S. Huck, H.-T. Normann, J. Oechssler, 2000. 
2 See S. Huck, H.-T. Normann, J. Oechssler, 2000, for a survey of  European and 
American anti-trust  policies on the  publication of individual firms’ data. 
3 The study of learning and behaviour in oligopoly has a long standing tradition in the 
experimental field of research. On the specific issue of information and behaviour, we 
recall here the seminal work of  C. Fouraker and S. Siegel (1963); for a more general 
survey on experimental oligopoly, see C. A. Holt (1995). 
4 It must be said that the divergences between the results of two papers can be partly 
explained by the different experimental settings and models.  The two experiments, in fact, 
differ in the number of firms in the market (two rather than four) and the design (in S. 
Huck et al., 2000 players chose actions from a finite grid; in A. Bosch-Domenech and N. 
Vriend, players could view the quantity/profit table before making their own choice). 
5 X. Vives (1985) showed that Bertrand settings are more competitive than Cournot 
settings, and this result is confirmed in experimental analyses on oligopoly markets (S. 
Huck, et al., 2000).  We examine this point in a duopoly context, that is proved to be less 
competitive than 4-firms market, as in S. Huck et al., 2000.  
6 C. Holt, 1995. 
7 S. Rassenti, S. S. Reynolds, V. L. Smith. and F. Szidarovszky, 2000;  R. Nagel and N. 
Vriend, 1999; S. Huck, H. Normann and J. Oechssler, 1999, P. Lupi, P. Sbriglia, 2003. 
8  Aspiration might however be linked to alternative statistics of the payoff distribution, 
such as the mode or the median; the authors prove that , also in these alternative settings,  
the model converges to a similar long run equilibrium.    
9 The “switching rate” is positively related to the magnitude of the profit differential. 
10 For this reason, H. Dixon defines his model a model of  “social” learning. 
11 The equilibrium values of output and prices are the same in the Bertrand and the 
Cournot settings (S. Martin, 2002). 
12 See F. Vega-Redondo, 1996, chapter 2;  M. Schaffer, 1989.   
13 For the equilibrium values in the differentiated products models we follow S. Huck, et 
al., 2000. The values are calculated maximising the profit differential between firm i  
choosing strategy qi  and firm  j choosing strategy 
'
j q
, that is:    26
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i j j i j i q q q q q q π π − = ∆
. 
14 In one case (Cournot D.P., ED 3) the experiment lasted 15 rounds, due to software 
failures. We include this data because, as our tests show, there was convergence to a 
market equilibrium even within this shorter session.  
15 There are several measure of the previsional success of  learning theories. The MSD 
statistics has been used in several experimental paper (see for reference: I.  Erev and A. 
Roth, I., 1998; C. Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho, 1999).   
16 The long run profit values are computed by estimating  an asymptotic unit root model . 
The model consists of the estimation of equations of the form:  
ε β α + + = −1 t t LnX LnX ;     where  Xt is  the average profit in period t  (t= 
1,2,…20). It is easy to check that: 
















17 These models, studied by Hamilton J. (1990), have been extensively used for their ability in 
replicating business cycle features. In particular, as in MS-AR models the regime shift governing 
process generates dynamic factor structures, they synthesize both non-linear and dynamic factors 
modelling for evaluating the macroeconomic fluctuations. The non-linearity of the MSM arises 






















































Table 10: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Parameters
(Bertrand)
Test
Player 1 -76.25 2.97 -0.20 0.00 0.45 Yes
Player 2 -5.84 29.30 -0.01 0.26 0.08 Yes
Player 3 -30.14 25.86 -0.28 0.09 0.01 Yes
Player 4 -0.24 57.90 -0.26 0.59 0.15 Yes
Player 5 -119.34 6.79 0.12 0.01 0.25 Yes
Player 6 NOT ERGODIC
Player 7 -2.31 108.91 0.13 0.72 0.08 No
Player 8 -5.56 1.44 0.35 0.35 0.28 No
Player 9 -89.11 -5.14 -0.33 0.35 0.09 Yes
Player 10 17.94 100.12 0.08 0.50 0.01 No
Player 11 -112.25 19.40 -0.03 0.04 0.33 Yes
Player 12 -57.16 7.25 -0.48 0.08 0.49 Yes
Player 13 -16.84 71.09 -0.32 0.24 0.02 Yes
Player 14 -11.83 -11.30 0.25 0.33 0.28 No
Player 15 4.40 4.68 -0.42 0.32 0.33 No
Player 16 1.33 69.30 -0.66 0.82 0.26 Yes
1 µ 2 µ 1 α 12 p 21 p
Table 11: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Parameters
(Cournot DP)
Test
Player 1 11.69 14.01 -0.35 0.57 0.31 No
Player 2 -102.46 1.70 -0.05 0.12 0.80 Yes
Player 3 -10.40 17.18 -0.12 0.50 0.24 No
Player 4 -1.18 19.15 -0.20 0.04 0.64 No
Player 5 -63.76 4.29 -0.84 0.32 0.66 Yes
Player 6 -11.41 38.88 -0.41 0.20 0.08 Yes
Player 7 -1.68 44.78 -0.34 0.89 0.11 Yes
Player 8 -15.46 20.66 -0.48 0.60 0.26 Yes
Player 9 -96.72 11.52 -0.23 0.00 0.17 Yes
Player 10 -3.86 4.39 -0.32 0.27 0.32 No
Player 11 -85.23 3.15 -0.18 0.02 0.50 Yes
Player 12 -25.73 8.45 -0.43 0.06 0.25 Yes
Player 13 -82.55 4.02 -0.01 0.22 0.62 Yes
Player 14 -4.82 54.95 -0.15 0.56 0.03 Yes
Player 15 -1.36 4.05 -0.02 0.31 0.27 No
Player 16 -13.45 13.37 -0.48 0.32 0.38 No




















































Table12: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Parameters
(Cournot  HP)
Test
Player 1 -15.93 38.35 -0.38 0.26 0.31 Yes
Player 2 -17.09 8.41 0.32 0.23 0.26 No
Player 3 -51.63 41.83 -0.56 0.45 0.48 Yes
Player 4 -36.66 40.78 -0.51 0.64 0.31 Yes
Player 5 -16.04 72.78 0.21 0.65 0.35 Yes
Player 6 -5.09 4.99 -0.63 0.42 0.35 No
Player 7 -53.05 15.33 -0.64 0.13 0.75 Yes
Player 8 -14.86 10.99 -0.28 0.14 0.02 Yes
Player 9 -9.29 79.06 -0.17 0.56 0.09 Yes
Player 10 -20.20 16.45 -0.49 0.18 0.35 Yes
Player 11 -7.81 58.26 -0.61 0.24 0.25 Yes
Player 12 -30.40 8.60 -0.49 0.14 0.42 Yes
Player 13 -8.75 14.43 -0.04 0.31 0.48 Yes
Player 14 -22.58 22.24 -0.31 0.35 0.32 Yes
Player 15 -15.45 56.33 -0.29 0.94 0.06 Yes
Player 16 -34.73 42.40 0.15 0.68 0.32 Yes
Player 17 -4.22 4.28 -0.03 0.23 0.34 No
Player 18 -27.14 55.18 0.13 0.38 0.28 Yes




Figure 7: Smoothed Probabilities of Regime 1 (Bertrand)
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
Player 4 Player 5 Player 6
Player 7 Player 8 Player 9
Player 10 Player 11 Player 12
Player 13 Player 14 Player 16




200 MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player1  Mean(player1) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5








50 MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player2  Mean(player2) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5





0 5 10 15 20
0
100
MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player3  Mean(player3) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5





0 5 10 15 20
0
50
100 MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player4  Mean(player4) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5





0 5 10 15 20
-100
0
100 MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player5  Mean(player5) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5





0 5 10 15 20
-100
0
MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19 player6  Mean(player6) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5










MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19 player7  Mean(player7) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5
1.0 Probabilities of Regime 1




MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player8  Mean(player8) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5










MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19 player9  Mean(player9) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5
1.0 Probabilities of Regime 1




MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player10  Mean(player10) 
Probabilities of Regime 1











MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player11  Mean(player11) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5










MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player12  Mean(player12) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5










MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player13  Mean(player13) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5





0 5 10 15 20
-100
0
MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player14  Mean(player14) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5









MSM(2)-AR(1), 1 - 19
player16  Mean(player16) 
0 5 10 15 20
0.5







Figure 8: Smoothed Probabilities of Regime 1 (Cournot DP)
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Figure 9: Smoothed Probabilities of Regime 1 (Cournot HP)
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FIG. 2C: BERTRAND MARKET (D.P.) 
 
  










































































































FIG. 3C: BERTRAND MARKET (D.P.)  










































































































































































































FIG. 5C: BERTRAND MARKET (D.P.)  













































































































FIG. 6C: BERTRAND MARKET (D.P.) 